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"JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED"'
THE ABUSE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DELAY
"The history of liberty has largely been the2 history of
the observance of procedural safeguards."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."3 Individuals are also granted
the constitutional right to "be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures"4 and any warrants must be
based on a probable cause standard.' In so restraining the power of
the government, constitutional provisions often have protected the
public from the sometimes insensitive hand of the state. Since their
creation, these amendments have served as strong foundations for
the democracy upon which we rely to protect our guaranteed
freedoms and rights.6 The loss of an individual's liberty after s/he
is arrested without a warrant comes within the protection of the due
process provisions of the state and federal constitutions.7 These
provisions, therefore, mandate the safeguards of an adversary
hearing to determine probable cause!
The United States
Constitution requires an adversary hearing in certain civil cases such
as those involving the prejudgment deprivation of a person's
property, such as the revocation of a license or the garnishment of
1The maxim is attributed to William E. Gladstone, but remains unverified.
PETER'S QuoTATIONs 276 (Laurence J. Peters ed., 1977).
2 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) (reversing
murder convictions based on evidence obtained from defendants arrested,
questioned, and held without arraignment).
3U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4

U.S. CONST. amend.

IV.

I Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (broadly applying "totality of the
circumstances" approach to probable cause determination); Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. 204 (1821) (holding that specific and definite cause must be recited in the
warrant).
6 Robert I. Berdon, Liberty and Property Under the Procedural Due Process Clause:
The Requirement of an Adversary Hearing to Determine ProbableCause, 53 CONN. BAR
J. 31-32 (1979).
7 Id. at 31.
8 Id. at 47.
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wages.9 If this is the case, it is absurd that a human being who is
accused of crime is not afforded a comparable hearing upon any
significant interference with, or deprivation of, his or her liberty."
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, when speaking for a
unanimous Court, "[i]t cannot be that the safeguards of the person,
so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less
than those that protect from a liability in debt.""
As soon as a person hears the phrase "you are under arrest,"
his or her life changes and s/he loses the freedom to act
independently. For the next twenty-four to seventy-two hours, s/he
is virtually severed from the rest of society and swallowed up by the
massive machinery of police and court procedures which are but a
small part of the criminal justice system." Under current New York
City procedure, the probable cause basis for a warrantless arrest is
first reviewed by a judicial magistrate at the arrestee's initial
appearance before a local criminal court, the arraignment. 3
Arraignment is not a mere technical formality ....
Prompt arraignment insures that defendant is advised
of the charges against him, and of his right to
counsel, to seek bail, to communicate with counsel,
family and friends and to advise as to his
whereabouts, to undertake prompt investigation of
the charges, and to do all that can be done to meet
the challenge of the arrest. The arraignment is a
crucial stage in the proceedings and from the
defendant's point of view it is the first time that he is
brought into neutral territory after being arrested,
fingerprinted, photographed and held
incommunicado for
a reasonable period pending
14
police processing.

9Id.
10

Id.

1United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916), quoted in Berdon, supra
note 6, at 47.
12 Berdon, supra note 6, at 44.
13Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 375 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020
(1989).
" People v. Davis, 118 Misc. 2d 122, 124 Gust. Ct. Westchester Cty. 1983).
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"Governments historically have wrestled with the difficult

task of balancing the individual's right to liberty with society's need
to control crime."'" This Note examines attempts made by the
courts of the State of New York to balance an accused individual's
interest in liberty with the state's interest in procedural efficiency
within the complex structure of its criminal justice system. Section
I provides a description of the process by which arrestees are taken
from the streets of New York to an arraignment courtroom. Section
I will illustrate the experiences a suspect who is arrested without a
warrant suffers before s/he is afforded either counsel or a probable
cause determination of his or her arrest.
Section II will examine the case history of this issue by
analyzing the United States Supreme Court decision in Gerstein v.
Pugh."'6 In the seminal Gerstein decision, the Court articulated the
nature of the probable cause hearing and addressed the permissible
duration of post-arrest detention. 7 In Gerstein, however, the Court
failed to resolve a series of issues relating to post-arrest detentions
and did not provide a procedural standard. The nebulous standard
provided by the Gerstein"s Court therefore allowed lower federal
courts to circumvent the Court's actual holding. 9
Section III discusses in detail the case of Williams v. Ward,2"
a federal class action brought by the Criminal Defense Division of the
Legal Aid Society in 1985. The Williams decision raises an issue
critical to our criminal justice system: the constitutionally permissible
length of time an arrestee may be detained before probable cause for
the arrest is established by a judicial officer. This section will trace
the entire history of Williams, and will focus on the cases and statutes
relied on by the respective courts in shaping each Williams
decision.2'
Section IV will examine the Legal Aid Society's successful
efforts in state court to have a twenty-four hour time limit placed on
the granting of probable cause determinations. This section will trace
" James H. Settle, Williams v. Ward, Compromising the Constitutional Right to
PromptDeterminationof ProbableCause Upon Arrest, 74 MINN. L. REV. 196, 198 (1989).
16 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
17id.
I d.

19 See, e.g., Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

1020 (1989). See also infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
20845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 92-168.
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the case of People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown' from the Society's initial
victory in New York State Supreme Court' to its tremendous
triumph in the New York State Court of Appeals in March 1991.24
Section V outlines the recent decision in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin,' in which the Supreme Court allowed jurisdictions
which choose to combine probable cause determinations with other
pretrial proceedings, to do so in a "reasonably feasible"'2 time, not
to exceed forty-eight hours after arrest.' Finally, Section VI will
examine the public policy issues underlying the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the potentially disastrous consequences
an individual may suffer as a result of the loss of liberty stemming
from pre-arraignment detention.
This Note concludes that,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recent decision,' New York's
twenty-four hour maximum time limit on pre-arraignment detention
is essential to guarantee that each citizen is given the full measure of
protection that the Constitution affords."

I. THE PROCES OF DETAINMENT
"The process by which arrestees presently make their way
from the streets of New York to an arraignment courtroom is long
and complex."''3 In general, the initial eleven to fifteen hours
following a warrantless arrest are consumed by police functions that
include searching and securing the arrestee and ultimately
transporting him or her to the central booking facility in the county
in which the arrest was made.3' Upon making a warrantless arrest,
a New York City police officer first conducts a frisk search of the
arrestee at the scene of the arrest.32 The suspect is transported to

77 N.Y.2d 422 (1991).
People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
24People
25111
2

ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 77 N.Y.2d 422 (1991).
S. Ct. 1661 (1991).

Id. at 1670.

17 Id.

Id. at 1661.
Wendy L. Brandes, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment: Refining
the Standardof Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoBS. 445, 447 (1989).
' See Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 376 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1020 (1989).
31Id. at 376.
32

Id.

1992]

NOTES

407

the arresting officer's precinct where the officer and his supervisor
reassess the appropriateness of the arrest.'
Next, the arresting
officer completes several forms, including a complaint arrest form
and a property voucher form.Y The arrestee is transported to the
central booking facility where s/he is photographed and
fingerprinted, and the police conduct further supervisory review of
the charges.' The arrestee's fingerprints are sent to the New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services ("DCJS") for processing,
and a rap sheet consisting of the suspect's criminal record and
outstanding warrants is returned 3.
Criminal Justice Agency ("CJA") employees then interview the
arrestee.3 7 They utilize material from the rap sheets and the
interviews to assess applications for pre-trial release' and to
determine whether the arrestee is eligible for release at the
arraignment hearing.3 9 All of the information gathered thus far
about the arrestee is sent to the district attorney working in the
complaint room, who assesses the case and decides whether to send
the case to the grand jury, to draw up a complaint, or to dismiss the
case due to insufficient evidence.' If dismissal is improper, the
complaint, rap sheet, and CJA report are delivered to the docket
room of the criminal court and are distributed to the court, defense
counsel, prosecutors, and the police.41 Once an arrestee's papers are
filed in the docket room, the police transport the arrestee to a feeder
pen 2 attached to the courtroom. 3 Once placed in the pen, the
arrestee is available for an interview with defense counsel.4 At the
interview, defense counsel elicits as much information as possible
about the arrestee's case, his or her criminal history, and his or her

Id.

3

m Id.
35
id.
' Williams, 845 F.2d at 376-77.
7 Id. at 377.

Id. at 376.
Id.
4 Id.
"Williams, 845 F.2d at 378.
"A feeder pen is the area behind the courthouse where arrestees are held until
they can be seen by a judge. Id.
3id.
3

9

"Id. at 379.
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eligibility for bail.' Finally, after the interview is completed, the
arrestee is ready to be arraigned.'
At the arraignment, a state court judge determines whether
probable cause is met 7 and then determines the practicability and
possibility of pre-trial release.'
Plea bargains 9 are often made
during arraignment.5
Including arraignments where final
dispositions are reached, the typical arraignment takes between five
and ten minutes.5' More than one-third of all arrestees have their
cases finally disposed of at arraignment; this is due to the great
number of cases that are plea bargained down to lesser charges or
dismissed altogether.5 2 Arrestees must often sit in jail for more than
two or three days before they are arraigned and their cases are
dismissed."
II. GERSTEIN V. PUGH:
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DETENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION

In March of 1971, Robert Pugh and Nathaniel Henderson
were arrested in Dade County, Florida, and were charged under a
prosecutor's information"' with several offenses." At the time of
the arrest, Florida law allowed prosecutors to charge all non-capital
crimes by information without first obtaining a preliminary
hearing.' Accordingly, an arrestee could be detained prior to trial
solely on the basis of the probable cause determination by the
' Williams, 845 F.2d at 379.
4Id.

at 380.

Id. A determination of probable cause consists of a reasonable ground for
belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of. Id.
48Id.
'4Plea Bargaining is "[tihe process whereby the accused and the prosecutors in

a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1037 (5th ed. 1979).
o Williams, 845 F.2d at 380.

Id.
I'
52

Id.

13

Id.

5'An information is an accusation exhibited against a person, for a criminal
offense without an indictment. See generally Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884) (sustaining prosecution by information rather than indictment).
' Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105 (1975).
56

id.
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prosecutor.57 Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action
in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and
claiming a constitutional right to a probable cause hearing.' The
district court granted the relief sought," holding that "the Fourth
and Fourteenth amendments give all arrested persons charged by
information a right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable
cause.'160 The defendants were ordered to provide plaintiffs with an
immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for
further detention,' and were required to submit a plan which
would provide a preliminary hearing in all cases initiated by
information as well.62
The Purdy Plan6 prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure
whereby the accused would be given a "first appearance hearing"
before a magistrate at the time of arrest; at the hearing the accused
would be entitled to counsel, allowed to summon and cross-examine
witnesses, and allowed to have a transcript recorded.' The Purdy
Plan further provides that the accused were to be released if the
magistrate found that no probable cause existed.'
The district court adopted the Purdy Plan but stayed
implementation pending appeal. 66 While the appeal was pending,
the Dade County judiciary adopted a similar preliminary hearing
system,' and the court of appeals remanded the case to determine
the constitutionality of the newly established Dade County plan.'
Before these findings were made, the Florida Supreme Court
amended statewide procedural rules governing preliminary
hearings;" subsequently, the district court directed its inquiry to
57

1d.

Id.at 106-07.
5 Id. at 107.
'5Gerstein,420 U.S. at 107.
61

Id. at 107-08.

62 Id. at 108.

' The Purdy Plan received its name from its drafter, Sheriff E. Wilson Purdy.
For an overview of the entire plan, see Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490,490-93
(S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
"Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108.
65Id.
66Id.

at 109.

67 id.
6Id.
69 FLA.

R. CRIM. PROC. 3.131(a).
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these new rules in Pugh v. Rainwater.m The amended rules
mandated that an accused be brought before a judicial officer within
twenty-four hours after arrest.71 But, the magistrate did not actually
have to make a binding probable cause determination at this first
appearance hearing.'
Another crucial difference between the
amended Florida rules and the Purdy Plan was that the preliminary
hearings for the new Florida rules were restricted to felony
charges'm and were not afforded to those arrestees charged by
information or indictment.74
In Pugh, the district court noted that the constitutional
question'm was left unanswered despite the adoption of the new
rules since an individual charged by 'information still could be
confined prior to trial without a probable cause hearing.' 6 The
district court thus reaffirmed its original ruling and declared the
system unconstitutional."
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part.?'
The decision provided that the amended Florida Rules would be
acceptable provided that all defendants being detained pending trial
were afforded a preliminary'hearing. 79 State Attorney Gerstein
submitted a petition for review and the United States Supreme Court
'0 355 F. Supp. 1286, 1287-88 (S.D. Fla.), affd in part and vacated in part, 483 F.2d
778 (5th Cir. 1973), aff d in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975).
7 Id. at 1286.
' Id. at 1292 n.4.

'Id.

at 1289.

74Id. (citing FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3:131); see In re Rule 3:131(b), Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 289 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (amending Rule 3:131(b) to require
state attorneys to complete investigations within 96 hours of arrest).
' The constitutional question was whether an accused who was charged by
information without an indictment could be confined without first appearing before
a neutral magistrate. Pugh, 355 F. Supp. at 1289.
76

Id.

77Id.

' Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), affd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
" Id. The decision also provided that persons charged with misdemeanors were
entitled to a preliminary hearing unless they were released on bond or charged
with a violation that carries no possibility of pretrial incarceration. Id. at 788-89.
The court also held that providing a longer time period for preliminary hearing of
persons accused of capital offenses was unconstitutional. Id. at 789.
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granted certiorari.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
decision, holding that the Fourth Amendment mandates a judicial
determination of probable cause prior to extended detention
following arrest.'1
The Court stated that a prosecutor's
determination of probable cause cannot justify an extended restraint
on a person's liberty 2 and, therefore, the judgment of a neutral
magistrate was essential.' The Court, however, disagreed with the
Fifth Circuit's holding that the probable cause determination must be
made in an adversary proceeding," entitling the accused to counsel
and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Instead, the Court
held that the probable cause determination mandated by the
Constitution does not require these adversarial safeguards.'
The Gerstein decision was critical because of the continued
reliance that lower courts have placed upon it in shaping their own
policies concerning post-arrest detention.' Gerstein held that the
Fourth Amendment requires the presentment of an arrestee to a
judicial officer for a probable cause hearing upon completion of all
steps incident to arrest.87 Nevertheless, the Gerstein decision did not
address (1) whether arrestees must be afforded this hearing in a
specified time period;' (2) what the steps incident to arrest are;89
or (3) whether combining the probable cause hearing with the initial
appearance is constitutional if so doing would cause extensive delay
in processing.'
Because the Gerstein decision left these crucial
Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
SId. at 117. See also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971).
' Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117. The Court stated that a neutral magistrate
determining probable cause was critical because a prosecutor's necessarily
adversarial role in law enforcement was inconsistent with the neutral role required
by the Constitution. Id. See also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S.

297 (1972).
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119.
Id. at 119-20. The Court stated that a probable cause determination has
traditionally been made by a magistrate in a non-adversarial proceeding and that
the Court has traditionally permitted informal proceedings. Id. at 120.
See Brandes, supra note 29, at 457; see also supra text accompanying notes 1819.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 103.
Brandes, supra note 29, at 446.
Ild.
90 Id.
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issues unresolved, it enabled courts such as the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit
to interpret the Gerstein standard in an extremely
91
broad manner.
III. WILLIAMS V. WARD: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRoMIr
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION COMPROMISED

Williams v. Ward' began in 1985, when a group of
individuals who had been arrested and detained for three days filed
a class action against the City of New York in the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York.' The class claimed
that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights" by failing to expedite the administrative procedures before
arrestees are given a hearing on probable cause before a neutral
magistrate. 95
The City of New York claimed that if the district court
granted a stay, it could reduce the amount of time necessary to
process arrestees and make a probable cause determination of the
arrest.96 The stay was granted, the case was placed on the inactive
calendar, and the parties were given the opportunity to resolve the
matter without proceeding with the action.9 The attempt proved
to be futile and when the time period between arrest and
arraignment began drastically to increase," the case was
91See, e.g., Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

1020 (1989).
671 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). This class action was brought on behalf of
the class of people in the New York City counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, and
Queens who are arrested without a warrant and are detained without a probable
cause hearing. Id. at 225-26. The named defendants in the suit included the Police
Commissioner of the City of New York, Commissioner of Correction of the City of
New York, and the Mayor of New York, all in their official capacities and the City
of New York itself. Id. at 228-29.
93Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 226. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
s Williams, 671 F. Supp. at 226.
Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020

(1989).
' Williams, 671 F. Supp. at 227. The parties engaged a mediator to help resolve
the matter without a trial. Id.
" Id. During the stay, records indicate that arrest to arraignment time increased
at a rapid rate. Id.
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reactivated." On October 17, 1986, the district court entered an
order advancing the trial." ° The parties thereafter agreed to try the
case on the basis of a stipulated set of facts.' 01
The information received by the court indicated that the City
of New York conceivably could process an arrestee within seven
hours of arrest."° But, steps not absolutely necessary to complete
the arrest, such as fingerprinting, expanded this time to a period of
seventeen hours, on average."' The City of New York also
suggested that processing delays were common in New York as a
result of the City's practice of appending the probable cause hearing
to arraignment."M The City of New York claimed that this policy
delayed the procedure because a probable cause determination could
not commence until all pre-arraignment procedures had been
completed.1' 5
The federal district court held for the plaintiffs and found
that the Constitution required it to impose a twenty-four hour time
limit on pre-arraignment detention.1'6 The court explained that the
injunction barring the city from detaining an arrestee for more than
twenty-four hours without a determination of probable cause for
arrest would permit the current arraignment procedures in New
York to continue without change."
The court believed that the
City would face no difficulty meeting a twenty-four hour
presentment requirement because the stipulated facts had shown that
in most cases arrestees in New York could be processed in seventeen
hours." s The court relied on both the Gerstein"°9 decision and the

9 Id.
100 Id.

" Williams, 671 F. Supp. at 227. See Exhibit A to the decision for a list of the
facts as stipulated. Id.
102 Id. at 226. The court found that the defendants had added additional police
personnel and had increased the number of courtrooms and court personnel

involved in the arrest and arraignment processes. Based on this information, the
court believed an arrestee could be processed within seven hours. Id.
10

Id.

104 Brandes,

supra note 29, at 467.
sWilliams, 671 F. Supp. at 227.
106 Id. at 227. The court granted the plaintiffs declaratory relief. Id.
107 id.
1'8Id. at 226-28.
1- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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feasibility of completing all procedures within the allotted time.10
The court enjoined the defendants from taking more than seven
hours to complete procedures incidental to the arrest."' All steps
not absolutely necessary to complete the arrest, for example,
fingerprinting, could be completed after presentment if these steps
could not be conducted within twenty-four hours."'
The City of New York appealed the district court's decision
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."' The Second
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that. post-arrest
detainment of up to seventy-two hours was constitutionally
permissible in New York City based on the "totality of processes"
afforded the arrestee."4
The Second Circuit became the first federal court to interpret
Gerstein as allowing delays of over twenty-four hours before
requiring a judicial determination of probable cause."' The Second
Circuit carefully reviewed New York City's arrest to arraignment
procedure. In so doing, the court found that the district court's
determinations that the steps "necessary and incidental"'16 to an
arrest should not take more than six or seven hours and that
twenty-four hours is sufficient to complete all steps necessary for an
arraignment, were legal conclusions rather than factual findings.'17
Thus, the Second Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's
decision."' The Second Circuit relied heavily on the notion that
"Gerstein 'did not.., mandate a specific timetable' for probable cause
determinations,""' 9 and thus, courts are left with a great deal of
110 Brandes, supra note 29, at 468.
"' Williams, 671

F. Supp at 227-28.

112 id.

1'' Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020
(1989).
14 Id. at 386.
15 Brandes, supra note 29, at 469.
116 Williams, 671 F. Supp. at 227. The district court enjoined the defendant City

of New York from taking more than seven hours to complete steps necessary and
incidental to the arrest, so that other steps such as fingerprinting and interviews by
counsel could take place before the arraignment and the expiration of twenty-four
hours. Id. at 227-28.
117Williams, 845 F.2d at 382.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 383.
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flexibility in creating their own pre-arraignment rules. 2 '
A. Misplaced Reliance on Schall v. Martin
In Schall v. Martin,1 ' the Supreme Court held that a
probable cause determination at the initial appearance of a detained
juvenile was not constitutionally mandated."2 The Court found
that brief pretrial detention was warranted, if it was based on a
finding of serious risk that an arrested juvenile may commit a crime
before his or her return date.'2
When deciding Williams, 12

the Second

Circuit found

Schall'" to be controlling precedent and erroneously analogized the
seventy-two hour detention of a juvenile to that of a detained
adult. 26 The Second Circuit's reliance on Schall was misplaced
since the two cases address vastly different issues.
First, the Schall Court addressed the state's inherent interest
as parens patriae127 in protecting and promoting the welfare of
juveniles."2 The Court sought to protect juveniles from their own
behavior and acknowledged the state's interest in preventive
detention. 29 In contrast, the detention of those arrested in Williams
was not preventive but rather a device invoked primarily for
administrative convenience. 13° Second, the statute upheld in

121

Brandes, supra note 29, at 470.
467 U.S. 253 (1984).

122

Id. at 269-70 (holding that the determination could take place up to seventy-

12'

two hours later).
121
124

Id. at 281.
Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020

(1989).

467 U.S 253 (1984).
Williams, 845 F.2d at 388. This conclusion by the Williams court is curious
considering that the Schall court explained that the Constitution does not require
identical treatment of adults and juveniles. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
'
Schall, 487 U.S. at 263. Parens patriae refers to the role of the state as
guardian and protector of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles and the
1

infirm. Id.
128 id.
129Id.
130

at 265.
Williams, 845 F.2d at 393 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Schall131 provided a juvenile with an initial appearance before a
judicial officer within a limited time." The fact that New York's
pre-arraignment system did not contain this procedural safeguard
shows further that the Williams court's reliance on Schall was
nisplaced.'3
Third, the Schall Court found that the juveniles' interest in
freedom from institutional constraints was not highly significant
because unlike adults, juveniles are at all times under the protective
custody of either their parents or the state.13 This is not true for
adults, such as those arrested in Williams. Additionally, even a single
day in jail for an adult can mean disastrous consequences for
employment, family relationships, and individual welfare."3
Finally, the Second Circuit overlooked the disparate
post-arrest treatments of the two groups of plaintiffs. After a
juvenile's initial appearance, s/he is confined to a minimum security
facility where s/he is provided with counseling, education, and
Pre-trial detainees are often confined
recreational programs."
under conditions more oppressive than those faced by convicted and
sentenced felons.137 Thus, the Schall Court made apparent the
uniqueness of the juvenile's situation. 13

131Schall, 467 U.S. at 255 (quoting NEW YORK JuD. LAW 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney
1989) (Family Court Act) ("authorizes pre-trial detention of an accused juvenile

delinquent based on a finding that there is a 'serious risk' that the child 'may before
the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a
crime.'")).
132

Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.

1
1

Williams, 845 F.2d at 393 (Stewart, J., dissenting.).
Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.

'
'

Williams, 845 F.2d at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting.).
Schall, 467 U.S. at 271.

Berdon, supra note 6, at 44, quoted in Paul Rice, Bail and the Administration of
'
Bail in the State of Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REv. 1, 13 (1971).
1" Settle, supra note 15, at 220. Note that in juvenile proceedings the authorities

evaluate the juvenile to decide whether to place him or her in secure or non-secure
detention. Schall, 467 U.S. at 271.
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B. Misplaced Reliance on the ALI Model Code
of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit placed
significant reliance on the ALI Model Code139 to support its
decision that a determination of probable cause was not required
within twenty-four hours."4 The court found that a probable cause
determination could be made at an adjourned session within seventytwo hours of arrest.'41 The reliance on the Model Code is
erroneous for two reasons.
First, although the Model Code allows a reasonable cause
determination to be made sometime after the initial hearing," it
still affords the arrestee an initial appearance before a magistrate
within twenty-four hours of arrest." The New York City system
does not guarantee such an appearance before a judicial officer and
therefore fails to ensure a prompt notification of the charges pending
against the accused.'"
Second, the Model Code does not authorize the detainment
of arrestees for seventy-two hours without a probable cause
determination.'45 According to the Code, detention prior to this
determination shall not exceed forty-eight hours."
Thus, the
Second Circuit's reliance on the Model Code was misplaced. 47
Additionally, the court also erred in overlooking a more recent ALI
proposal regarding pre-arraignment procedure that was promulgated
13 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
CODE].

§§ 130.2(1), 1310.1 (1975)

[hereinafter MODEL

" Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 387 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020
(1989).

141 Id. at 387. The Williams court relied on the ALI Model Code procedures

approved in Gerstein, which required an "adjourned session" within seventy-two
hours of arrest. Id. This analysis of Gerstein, however, was a significant departure
from previous interpretations of Gerstein. See Settle, supra note 15, at 221.
'42 MODEL CODE § 310.2(2).
143 Id. at § 310.1(1) (requiring that an arrestee be "brought before a court at the
earliest time after the arrest that a judicial officer... is available and in any event
within twenty-four hours after the arrest.").
4 Settle, supra note 15, at 222.
" Brandes, supra note 29, at 471.
146 MODEL CODE § 301:2(i).
1" Brandes, supra note 29, at 471 (according to Brandes, the court misread the
Model Code concerning the maximum period of detainment legally permitted
without a probable cause determination).
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by the time Williams was decided."M The proposal provided that
any arrestee was to come before the court within twenty-four hours
of his arrest or be released with a citation or on bail. 49 The Second
Circuit could easily have ascertained the intent of the American Law
Institute by examining this recent proposal. 5°
C. Reasons for Second Circuit's Reversal
The Second Circuit reversed the district court in Williams,"'
holding that the additional benefits afforded arrestees by the New
York City criminal justice system justified the detention of those
arrested for up to seventy-two hours without a determination of
probable cause." 2 New York City's arraignment procedure
provides an adversarial setting"s where the accused is present and
Because plea bargaining and bail
accompanied by counsel."
negotiating are allowed at the arraignment, a final disposition of the
case often is reached at this stage." The court determined that the
longer detention was justified based on the benefits accompanying
the arraignment enjoyed by the accused."s
The Court felt that the complexity of the arraignment process
in New York City also warranted extended detention without a
determination of probable cause. 7 The court looked to the "sheer
volume of arrests"'" in New York City and certain traffic
of arrestees to
conditions which make the prompt transportation
59
judicial facilities difficult if not impossible.
The reversal was based in part on the misplaced reliance the
'4

Id. at 472.

149MODEL CODE §

310.1(1).

150 Brandes, supra note 29, at 472.

15 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989).
152 Id. at 387. The court's decision was also based on the prior discussion of the
court's erroneous reliance on the ALI Model Code procedures and the Gerstein
decision. See supra text and accompanying notes 115-120, 139-150.
" Williams, 845 F.2d at 386.

154Id.

Id. During the first five months of 1989, 36% of all arraignments in New
York City resulted in final dispositions. Id. at 387 n.17.
155

1 Id. at 386.
157 Id. at 381-82.
1 Id. at 381.
'1Id.
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Second Circuit placed on the Schall case and the Model Code."W
Relying on these sources and on the above findings, the court found
that a seventy-two hour limit on probable cause determination was
acceptable.1 6'
Shortly after the Second Circuit's reversal of Williams, 6 2 the
Legal Aid Society petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari."6 The Society stressed that the Supreme Court's review
was required to determine: (1) whether the Second Circuit's
determination that seventy-two hours of post-arrest detention meets
the Gerstein requirement that a probable cause determination follow
"promptly"' after administrative steps incident to arrest are
completed,"6 and (2) whether the majority's reliance on Schall'"
to determine the Fourth Amendment rights of adult arrestees was
misplaced. 67 The Legal Aid Society's petition was denied."
IV. PEOPLE OF NEW YORK EX REL. MAXIAN V. BROWN:
NEW YORK STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS & LEGAL AID SOCIETY'S

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
After the United States Supreme Court denied the Legal Aid
Society's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Society brought a series
of writs in New York State Court asserting a superior state
statutory"39 and constitutional 7 ° right to a speedy
arraignment.'"
After carefully reviewing the contemporary law and that of

'

Settle, supra note 15, at 211.
F.2d at 390.

161Williams, 845
162

Id.

Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989) [hereinafter Williams Petition].
'"Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
1"

'

Williams Petition at 5-10.

'"Id.at 5 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
167 Id.
" Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020
(1989).
169N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.20(i) (McKinney 1989).
170N.Y.

CoNST. art. I, § 12.

" People of New York ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, No. 40259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990),
affd, 164 A.D.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), aff d, 77 N.Y.2d 422 (1991).
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the petitions and returns in the case, Justice Brenda Soloff, speaking
for the Supreme Court, New York County, concluded that state law
was being violated and that arraignments in New York County were
not taking place "without unnecessary delay."'" Justice Soloff held
that a period of delay in arraignment of over twenty-four hours
raises a presumption that the delay is unnecessary within the
meaning of the New York Arrest Without a Warrant statute,"7
requiring, on demand, a satisfactory explanation of that delay.174
Section 140.20 of New York Criminal Procedure Law 7" provides in
relevant part:
Upon arresting a person without a warrant, a police
officer, after performing without unnecessary delay
all recording, fingerprinting and other preliminary
police duties required in the particular case must,
except as otherwise provided in this section, without
unnecessary delay bring the arrested person or cause
him to be brought before a local criminal court and
file therewith an appropriate accusatory instrument
charging him with the offense or offenses in
question.17a
Lacking an acceptable explanation, such arrestee is entitled to be
released.' 77
Justice Soloff based the court's holding on her belief that the
arraignment is a critical stage of the proceeding and a long delay
prior to arraignment therefore is intolerable.Th She stated,
In short, arraignment is the time where an arrested
person emerges into the light after having been held
in many separate places over many hours and even
days. For many people charged with lower level
felonies, with misdemeanors and with violations, it
122

Id., slip op. at 5 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.20(1) (McKinney

1989)).
'3

N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.20(1) (McKinney 1989) [hereinafter § 140.201.

1"Maxian, slip op. at 31.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW

175 N.Y.
176

id.

177

id.

'7'

Maxian, slip op. at 31.

§ 140.20(1) (McKinney 1989).
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represents the only time they will be incarcerated on
this arrest. For others, it is the time they not only
meet their attorneys and learn about their case, but it
is also, for people charged with felonies, the time to
consider whether or not they will testify before the
grand jury or at a preliminary hearing, if one is
held. 17
Justice Soloff determined that the "totality of the
processes"" completed before arraignment, at least those which
could be identified and timed, could usually be completed within
twenty-four hours "with time to spare including any travel which
must be done within New York County."'8 1 Justice Soloff looked
to the Second Circuit's suggestion that "the sheer volume of
cases 8 2 meant that there would be enormous coordination
problems," and concluded that it would be erroneous "to accept
uncritically that so urgent a matter as arraignment should be allowed
to take three times longer to achieve than the sum of all its necessary
parts.""' It did not appear to the court that the arraignment delay
in New York County resulted from preparing the additional benefits
of arraignment over and above what the reasonable probable cause
determination alone would require."s
The court found the
difficulty not in the explained delay, which was relatively short and
understandable,'" but rather in the unexplained delay which was
much longer and largely incomprehensible." 7
In making her decision, Justice Soloff examined the case files
of various men and women arrested in New York City in 1990.1"
The files graphically illustrated the unexplained and unnecessary
179

Id. at 7.

1w Id. at 15.
181 Id.

12

Id. at 15-16.

183

Maxian, slip op. at 16.
IId.

'1

id. at 17.

16 Id.

18 Id.
8

at 17-18.
Maxian, slip op. at 18-28.
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delay
in arraignment which takes place in New York City every
18 9
day.

Damon Roundtree was arrested at 1:01 p.m. on January 17,
1990 for shoplifting in Macy's Department Store.'" At that time,
he was charged with a class A misdemeanor. 9 Roundtree arrived
at central booking at 7:02 p.m., six hours after his arrest. 92 By
11:05 p.m., about ten hours after his arrest, Roundtree's fingerprint
sheet and a complaint were ready.'" At 1:15 a.m. on January 18,
Roundtree was sent to the 13th precinct to be lodged.'
He was
ordered to court at 9:50 a.m. on January 19, and arrived at the
courthouse at 11:20 a.m. 9 " At that point, he had been in custody
over 46 hours. At 4:30 p.m., Roundtree was arraigned.'" He had
been in custody for approximately fifty-one hours, yet the paperwork
had been allegedly completed in ten hours. 1
Analogously, Sei Boo was arrested for selling umbrellas
without a license on February 9, 1990.1" The complaint was sworn
on February 10 at 9:02 p.m. 199 The case was not ready for police
processing until February 12 at 11:15 a.m. Boo was not arraigned
until February 13, at 10:05 a.m., 2' approximately 94.5 hours after
he was arrested. In another remarkable case, Gordon Armstrong was
arrested on February 6, 1990 at 1:15 p.m.2' 2 He was charged with
9
'
The record in Maxian includes documentation pertinent to the habeas corpus
petitions of some 9,000 persons arrested without warrants between January 13 and
April 20, 1990. People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 224 (N.Y. 1991).
19' People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, Index No. 40259, slip op. at 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1990).
19 Id. Under federal and most state laws, an offense that is neither treason nor
a felony is classified as a misdemeanor. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1989); 1 CHARLES
E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 84-87 (1978). New York has various classes
of misdemeanors, with "A" being the most serious. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15
(McKinney 1987).
1' Maxian, slip op. at 18.
19 id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196

id.

197 Id.

1 Maxian, slip op. at 29.
1 Id.
200id.
20 id.
2D2id.
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the violation of driving with a suspended license.'
Yet, Mr.
Armstrong was not arraigned until February 9 at 10:30 a.m." He
had been in custody approximately 69 hours.
A pattern emerged from the cases studied which did not
markedly alter from petition to petition.' Justice Soloff explained
this pattern:
What emerges from the examples discussed, and
from those not discussed, is that there are long
periods of delay in the processing of cases. Long
means outside the norm as generally agreed to by the
parties in their papers here and before the Second
Circuit. Little attempt is made to explain the
delays.'
The court decided that a solution to the delay problem could only be
reached by imposing a specific time limit within which it could be
expected that all the steps necessary to arraignment would be
taken.'
If necessary, the court felt that certain steps could be
postponed until after the arrestee had been to court if such steps
prolonged the period past the accepted time limit.' Justice Soloff
ruled in favor of a twenty-four hour base beyond which delay must
be explained on a case-by-case basis.'
Justice Soloff proposed
three justifications in support of the twenty-four hour limit. First, it
appeared that twenty-four hours was a reasonable amount of time to
complete all steps necessary to arraignment.2 '
Second, a
twenty-four hour base was the most frequently accepted amount of
time for the first appearance, including a determination of probable
cause.2" Third, for certain charges, twenty-four hours was too
long, and to allow any more time before a court appearance would
" Maxian, slip op. at 29.

Id. No time specification was given for the completion of the complaint or
police readiness. Id.
2 id.
2W Id.

' Maxian, slip op. at 29.
2 id.
2
Wid.
210

id.

211

Id.
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be unconscionable."
With respect to the third and final concern, Justice Soloff took
cognizance of the entire array of crimes for which people could be
arrested in New York; crimes ranging from murder to disorderly
conduct. 213 In recognizing that lower level felonies, misdemeanors
and violations constitute a majority of the arrests, 214 and that "[t]o
run a dual track system from arrest to arraignment for different types
21 Justice
of crimes would probably paralyze the entire process,""
Soloff explained that justice requires what is appropriate for the least
serious rather than the most serious crime.216
Taking into account the principal argument against the
twenty-four hour base rule for arraignments, that it often is not
achieved, Justice Soloff did not think a true effort had been
made.217 The most consistent and extended periods of arraignment
delay were occurring after all paperwork had been completed and
the police had announced their readiness. The court acknowledged
that Williams had raised some possible reasons for delay,2 8 but
held that "speculation should not form an integral part of an
219
acceptable period of delay.1

The Legal Aid Society's petition was granted to the extent
that a delay in arraignment of over twenty-four hours is
presumptively deemed "unnecessary."no Absent an acceptable
explanation for such delay, an arrestee is entitled to be released. 221
Justice Soloff's decision re-established some of the rights revoked by
the Second Circuit's reversal in Williams.' The Legal Aid Society
212

Maxian, slip op. at 29-30.

Id. at 30.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
213

218Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 389 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020

(1989).
219 Maxian, slip op. at 31.

Id. Upon examination of the petitions in Maxian, Judge Soloff saw no reason
why the pre-arraignment process could not be completed within twenty-four hours.

She found that the administrative steps incident to arraignment are often completed
well within twenty-four hours, only to have the arraignment inexplicably delayed
for many hours, and sometimes days, beyond the point of administrative readiness.
Id.
221 Id.
m Williams, 845 F.2d at 374.
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continued to bring forth individual writs every week to insure that
this victory in state court was upheld.
A. Appellate Division, First Department Decision
The police department appealed the judgement of the
Supreme Court, New York County, entered on or about April 20,
On October 30, 1990, the Appellate Division, First
1 99 0 .'
Department rendered a decision of the appeal of People ex rel. Maxian
v. Brown. 4 This decision granted certain habeas corpus petitions
and determined that an arraignment delay of more than twenty-four
hours is presumptively unnecessary. 22
Unless reasonably
explained, such a delay constitutes a violation of section

1 4 0 .2 0 l6

and requires a petitioner's release. 7 Justice Murphy affirmed the
judgment of the New York County Supreme Court.'
The
presumption that the delay of arraignment beyond twenty-four hours
is unnecessary was found to be proper under the requirements of
section 140.20." The court stressed the significance and desirability
of a prompt arraignment' relying on the "fundamental right of
citizens to be free from unwarranted deprivations of liberty, and the
ability of courts to assure that such deprivations do not occur." 1
"Indeed, if the judicial system is not to become increasingly irrelevant
to the determination of guilt and punishment every effort must be
made to assure that suspect's transfer to the court's custody for
arraignment is not unnecessarily delayed." 2

2 561
224id.

N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1990), affd, 568 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1991).

s Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
2 Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
Z1 Id.

§ 140.20 (McKinney 1998)).

2 id.

'

Id. The court reached its decision solely on the basis of the state statute,

finding it unnecessary to decide whether the same result would be compelled by

the New York State Constitution. Id.
2o Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
-" Id. at 424.
232 id.
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B. The Court of Appeals Decision
On March 26,1991, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed
the decision in People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown. 2' The court upheld
the appellate division decision stating that delays exceeding twentyfour hours in arraignment of persons arrested without a warrant are
presumptively unnecessary.'
Such delay without an effective
explanation was held to be violative of section 140.20, requiring all
those arrested without a warrant to be arraigned without
unnecessary delay.23 From this decision, it is apparent that
New York courts will continue to accord those arrested without a
warrant a more prompt probable cause determination than the
United States Supreme Court now mandates. This was made clear
on May 13, 1991, when the United States Supreme Court, in County
of Riverside v. McLaughlin,' finally answered the questions it had
left unresolved in the Gerstein37 case.
V. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS...

In August, 1987, Donald Lee McLaughlin brought a class
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 alleging that the holding of Gerstein
v. Pugh 39 had been violated by petitioner, County of Riverside.2'
McLaughlin alleged that the County of Riverside had failed to
provide persons arrested without a warrant with prompt probable
4
cause determinations."
As in New York, the County of Riverside
combined such probable cause determinations with the arraignment
procedure. 2'
County policy mandated that these hearings be
conducted within two days of arrest, excluding weekends and

_

570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991)
Id. at 223-24; see supra text accompanying note 212.
Criminal Procedure Law - PrearraignmentDetention, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1990, at

24.
2- 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).

n Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
24

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1991).

241

Id.

242 Id.
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holidays.2' After finding that the Gerstein decision was violated,
the district court issued a preliminary injunction which required a
judicial determination of probable cause to be afforded all those
arrested without a warrant within thirty-six hours of arrest, except
in exigent circumstances. 2'
On November 8, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order granting the preliminary
injunction against the County of Riverside.24 The court of appeals
determined that the County of Riverside's policy of granting probable
cause hearings within forty-eight hours was violative of Gerstein's
requirement of determination promptly after arrest. "[B]ecause no
more than [thirty-six] hours were needed 'to complete the
administrative steps incident to arrest,""'2 the County Riverside's
policy was clearly not in accord with Gerstein.
The Ninth Circuit thus joined the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits in interpreting Gerstein as requiring a
probable cause determination immediately following
completion of the administrative procedures incident
to arrest. By contrast, the Second Circuit understands
Gerstein to 'stres[s] the need for flexibility' and to
permit states to combine probable cause
determinations with other pretrial proceedings.247
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case in order to resolve
the conflict among the circuits as to what constituted a prompt
probable cause determination under Gerstein.2'
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court took into account
the competing interests articulated in Gerstein, the states' interests in
protecting public safety, and the possible repercussions prolonged
detention based on unfounded or incorrect suspicion might have on
the individual.249 After balancing these two significant interests,
the Court concluded that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial
243
244

id.
Id. at 1666.

245 id.
246

McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1666 (1991) (quoting McLaughlin v. Riverside,

888 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989)).
247 Id. at 1666-67 (citations omitted).
248 Id. at 1667.
249 Id. at 1668.
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determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a
general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of
Gerstein."' If a probable cause hearing is held within forty-eight
hours, the burden will be upon the arrested individual to prove that
his or her probable cause determination was delayed
unreasonably.21
The Supreme Court's decision is of the utmost significance
because it condones the delayed arraignment procedures of various
jurisdictions, including that of the Second Circuit which encompasses
New York. 2 Now, for the sake of administrative convenience, an
arrestee's constitutional right to a prompt probable cause
determination will be compromised. Justice Scalia summarized the
gravamen of the Supreme Court's ruling in his eloquent dissent:
The common law rule of prompt hearing had as its
primary beneficiaries the innocent-not those whose
fully justified convictions must be overturned to scold
the police; nor those who avoid conviction because
the evidence, while convincing, does not establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; but those so
blameless that there was not even good reason to
arrest them. While in recent years we have invented
novel applications of the Fourth Amendment to
release the unquestionably guilty, we today repudiate
one of its core applications so that the presumptively
innocent may be left in jail. Hereafter a law-abiding
citizen wrongfully arrested may be compelled to
await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine,
as it churns its cycle for up to two days--never once
given the opportunity to show a judge that there is
absolutely no reason to hold him, that a mistake has
been made. In my view, this is the image of a system
of justice that has lost its ancient sense of priority, a
system that few Americans would recognize as our
own. B

20

3

Id. at 1670.

5' McLaughlin, 111

S. Ct. at 1670.

252Id.

' Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Supreme Court now allows states to detain an individual
for up to two days before a neutral party determines if there was
probable cause to arrest that individual. This is so even though no
law enforcement agency, including New York's, has ever argued that
a twenty-four hour standard is beyond its capabilities.'
VI. INTERFERENCE wrrH LIBERTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

When analyzing the importance of a prompt probable cause
determination, it is crucial to recognize the significant personal losses
that a detained individual experiences. More consequential than the
interference occasioned by an arrest are the potentially disastrous
effects that an alleged defendant faces as a result of prolonged
detention.'
Unwarranted detention subjects the accused to tragic social,
physical, and emotional consequences.'
Extended confinement
leads to disruption of education and possible termination of
employment. 257
Being deprived of this employment and
consequently the opportunity to earn a living for their families can
prove disastrous.'
Relationships, both marital and familial, often
become strained, creating tensions that build until family stability is
ultimately impaired. 9
Even a single day in prison subjects the accused to a
permanent social stigma that often undermines and destroys the
accused's reputation.'
Even if the charges are dropped, the
damage created by a brief confinement in prison is often
irreparable. 2
The mental anguish suffered by arrestees as a result of
25 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Williams v. Ward, 671 F.

Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But see McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d
1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1989).
2 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
21 Id. See also RONALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM 32-91 (1965); LEwis R. KATZ, JUSTICE
LSTHE CRIME 51-62 (1972).
2s See GOLDFARB, supra note 256, at 31-92.
m Berdon, supra note 6, at 44.
Settle, supra note 15, at 200.

Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000,1005 (D.D.C. 1978). The court felt that
even a short detention could impugn an individual's reputation. Id.
261Id.
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prolonged detention can be substantial. 2 Those detained are
subjected to the disgrace and humiliation of public accusation of
crime.' For those never before charged with a crime or for those
wrongly accused, the anxiety created by the arrest and subsequent
detention pay a heavy emotional toll.'
A physical toll is imposed on the accused as a result of the
currently oppressive and degrading prison conditions.'" Both
guilty and innocent arrestees are subjected to deplorable conditions
in overcrowded cells, 2' which often place the accused at risk of
loss of life or limb at the hands of other inmates.267 Faced with the
possibility of being raped, beaten, or even murdered by their fellow
detainees, many arrestees attempt suicide before they are even
arraigned.' Noting that the majority of arrests that take place are
for low-level felonies, misdemeanors, and violations,269 subjecting
all those arrested to these conditions seems unjust and
inappropriate.'
The conditions of detention are so inhumane'
that no one should be forced to bear them before a probable cause
determination of their arrest is made.2
The last and perhaps most significant of the personal losses
resulting from pre-arraignment detention is the deprivation of
"personal freedom in the most immediate and literal sense of those
words."273
Justice Brandeis spoke of one of the most
comprehensive and valued rights of all civilized men as being "the
'
right to be let alone."274
Detention places in jeopardy the most
22

Berdon, supra note 6, at 45.

2

Id.
4Id.

Marc Zilversmit, Granting Prosecutors' Requests for Continuances of Detention
Hearings, 39 STAN. L. REv. 761, 780 (1987).
Settle, supra note 15, at 200.
7Zilversmit, supra note 265, at 780.
2M

Id.

' See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481

U.S. 1028 (1987).

Id.

270

' Berdon, supranote 6, at 44 (for an account of inhumane detention conditions
see Crystal Nix, Tension at Rikers: Complex Causes, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1986, § 1, at

46).
See Berdon, supra note 6, at 44.
z United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
274Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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valued of human rights, including the fundamental right to
privacy,' the right to travel, 6 the freedom to walk aboutY
and the freedom to associate freely with persons of one's own
choice. '
Because the loss of liberty occasioned by the detention of an
individual has such potentially devastating effects, it is reasonable to
afford those arrested a prompt determination of probable cause
before detaining them. A single day in jail is enough to endanger all
of the above interests,2 ' and an expeditious judicial review of a
police officer's warrantless arrest is therefore essential.
VII. CONCLUSION

New York City has made various attempts to balance
individual interests in liberty with state interests in procedural
efficiency within the intricate structure of its criminal procedure
system.' The complex arraignment process in New York City is
different from other criminal justice systems.2sl This is a result of
the massive quantity of arrests made on a day-to-day basis and the
problematic traffic conditions that exist throughout the city which
cause delay in transporting prisoners between facilities. 2
Those arrested in New York City are afforded a "totality of
processes,"' including the combination of a probable cause hearing
with procedures for fixing the terms of pre-trial release.'
It is
through these beneficial processes that New York City seeks to justify
its continued practice of prolonged detention.'
When, however,
for the sake of administrative convenience, a state appends the
probable cause hearing to the arraignment, which is sometimes

26

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).

27

Papochristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).

27

Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
settle, supra note 15, at 201.
S"

Id. at 198.
Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 386 n.15 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1020 (1989).
Id. at 381-82.
See People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 765 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (describing
the totality of processes concept).
' Williams, 845 F.2d at 386.
21
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conducted days after the arrest, an arrestee's right to a prompt
probable cause determination is compromised.'
The Fourth
Amendment 7 stands at the heart of the conflict between liberty
and crime control and acts as a procedural safeguard to ensure that
all seizures are reasonable and that all warrants are based on
probable cause.'
The Constitution 9 guarantees that all people
will be granted certain rights which cannot be altered to provide for
the unique problems and desires of a particular jurisdiction.2' As
the court in United States v. United States District Court 1 held in
discussing the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment:'
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed"
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should
be, an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to check
the "well-intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous
executive officers" who are a part of any system of
law enforcement.'
The Supreme Court has held that only when the state's compelling
interest in community safety becomes paramount can the protections
of the Fourth Amendment be diminished.'
The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Williams'9 became the first court to interpret
this as allowing the compromise of a constitutional right merely to
2
ease an administrative burden.
Brandes, supra note 29, at 476.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Settle, supra note 15, at 198-99.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
' Settle, supra note 15, at 212.
407 U.S. 297 (1971).
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states that "no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause." Id.
' United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 315-16 (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020
(1989).
2 Id. at 383. The Williams court noted that the Gerstein Court anticipated some
degree of experimentation in procedure by the states, in regard to the probable
cause structure. Id.
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As Gerstein' seemed to imply, each jurisdiction should
have the flexibility to establish a system that meets its own unique
needs.' This, however, cannot be accomplished by sacrificing the
rights of individuals and disembowelling the Fourth Amendment.
Gerstein' left many questions unanswered; the. Supreme
Court has finally answered these questions, in McLaughlin.3 It has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring a prompt probable
cause hearing, but has stated that such hearing does not necessarily
have to follow immediately upon completion of all administrative
steps incident to arrest.'
The present Court views "the Fourth
Amendment [as] permit[ting] a reasonable postponement of a
probable cause determination while the police cope with the
everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly
burdened criminal justice system.''
Some states will follow the Supreme Court's lead and will
utilize the entire forty-eight hours before affording a suspect a
probable cause determination, even if such extensive time is not
needed. Other states, however, will follow the lead of courts like the
New York Court of Appeals and establish a twenty-four hour time
limit on pre-arraignment detention. In these states, a suspect who
has been wrongly accused will be put at ease knowing that their case
will be reviewed by a neutral magistrate within twenty-four hours.
The establishment of such a benchmark time limit of twenty-four
hours insures that the rights of all arrestees will be protected in the
manner intended by the Constitution of the United States, and
therefore, should be instituted by the states, regardless of the
Supreme Court's callous decision in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin.'
Corey Steinberg
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
29Id.
29Id.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
m Id.
Id. at 1669.
m Id. at 1661.

